The United States aims to embark on its most active new nuclear construction program since the 1970s. In its most high-dollar nuclear deal yet, the Trump administration in October launched a partnership to build at least $80 billion worth of new, large-scale nuclear reactors, and chose Westinghouse Electric Company and its co-owners, Brookfield Asset Management and Cameco, for the job.
The money will support the construction of AP1000s, a type of pressurized water reactor developed by Westinghouse that can generate about 1,110 megawatts of electric power. These are the same reactors as units 3 and 4 at the Vogtle nuclear plant in Georgia, which wrapped up seven years behind schedule in 2023 and 2024 and cost more than twice as much as expected—about $35 billion for the pair. Along the way, Westinghouse, based in Cranberry Township, Penn., filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.
Chief executives of investor-owned utilities know that if they were to propose committing to similar projects on the same commercial terms, they’d be sacked on the spot. As a result, the private sector in the United States has been unwilling to take on the financial risk inherent in building new reactors.
The $80 billion deal with the federal government represents the U.S. nuclear industry’s best opportunity in a generation for a large-scale construction program. But ambition doesn’t guarantee successful execution. The delays and cost overruns that dogged the Vogtle project present real threats for the next wave of reactors.
Streamlining AP1000 Reactor Construction
What might be different about the next set of AP1000s? On the positive side, delivering multiple copies of the same reactor ought to create the conditions for a steady decline in costs. Vogtle Unit 3 was the first AP1000 to be built in the United States, and the lessons learned from it resulted in Vogtle Unit 4 costing 30 percent less than Unit 3. (Six AP1000s are currently operating outside the United States, and 14 more are under construction, according to Westinghouse.)
There’s been a bipartisan effort in the United States to streamline regulatory procedures to ensure that future projects won’t be delayed by the same issues that hampered Vogtle. The Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy (ADVANCE) Act that was signed into law by former U.S. President Joe Biden in 2024, includes several measures intended to improve processes at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
The last nuclear reactors to be built in the United States—Vogtle Units 3 and 4 in Waynesboro, Georgia—were completed seven years behind schedule and cost more than twice as much as expected.Georgia Power Co.
That included a mandated change in the NRC’s mission statement, setting a goal of “enabling the safe and secure use and deployment of civilian nuclear energy technologies”. It was a symbol of Congress’s intent to encourage the commission to support nuclear development.
In May President Trump built on that legislation with four executive orders intended to speed up reactor licensing and accelerate nuclear development—a framework that has yet to be tested in practice. In November the NRC published regulations setting out how it planned to implement the president’s orders. The changes are focused on removing redundant and duplicative rules.
One of Trump’s orders included a series of provisions intended to help build the U.S. nuclear workforce, but it’s clear that that will be a challenge. The momentum gained in training skilled workers during the construction at Vogtle is already dissipating. Without other active new reactor projects to move on to immediately in the United States, many of the people who worked there have likely gone into other sectors, such as liquified natural gas (LNG) plants.
Around the time that construction was wrapping up at Vogtle, many employers in the industry were already reporting difficulties in finding the staff they need, according to the Department of Energy’s 2025 United States Energy and Employment Report. Surveyed in 2024, 22 percent of employers in nuclear construction said it was “very difficult” to hire the workers they needed, and 63 percent said it was “somewhat difficult”. In nuclear manufacturing, 63 percent of employers said hiring was “very difficult”.
If reactor construction really begins to pick up, there is clearly a danger that those numbers will rise.
So just how many reactors will $80 billion buy? Assuming an average of $16 billion per AP1000—slightly less than for Vogtle, and allowing for cost reductions from economies of scale and learning-by-doing—the plan would mean five new reactors. That would represent an increase of about 5.7 percent in total U.S. nuclear energy generation capacity, if all the reactors currently in service remain online.
The full details of the $80 billion deal, including the precise allocation of financing and risk-sharing, have not been specified. But Westinghouse’s co-owner, Brookfield, did disclose that the partnership includes profit-sharing mechanisms that will give the U.S. government some of the upside if the initiative succeeds.
The Washington Post reported that after the U.S. signs the final contracts for $80 billion worth of new reactors, it will be entitled to 20 percent of all Westinghouse’s returns over $17.5 billion. And if Westinghouse’s valuation surpasses $30 billion, the administration can require it to be floated on the stock market. If that happens, the government will get a 20 percent stake.
Enriched uranium is loaded at Vogtle Unit 4.Georgia Power Co.
Japan’s government is also playing a key role. As part of a $550 billion U.S.-Japan trade deal struck in July, the Japanese government pledged large-scale investment in U.S. energy, including nuclear. Japanese companies, including Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Toshiba Group, and IHI Corp., are interested in investing up to $100 billion in the United States to support the construction of new AP1000s and small modular reactors (SMRs), the two governments said.
The Westinghouse deal supports a range of the administration’s objectives, including power for AI and investment and job creation in the American industrial sector. The focus on AP1000s also makes it possible to rely on U.S.-produced fuel, strengthening energy security. (Many of the designs for SMRs, which have garnered a considerable amount of excitement globally, use high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) fuel, which is not currently produced on a large scale in the United States).
U.S. Nuclear Energy Investment
There have been other recent moves to add additional nuclear capacity in the United States. Santee Cooper, a South Carolina utility, announced plans for completing the construction of two AP1000 reactors that had been abandoned in 2017 at the V.C. Summer site in Jenkinsville, S.C.
Separately, Google announced in October a deal with NextEra Energy to reopen a 615-MW nuclear plant in Iowa. The Duane Arnold Energy Center was shut down in 2020, and the aim is to have it operational again by the first quarter of 2029. Google has agreed to buy a share of the plant’s output for 25 years.
Construction of two AP1000 reactors at the V.C. Summer nuclear site in Jenkinsville, S.C. were abandoned in 2017 after delays and cost overruns. Executives leading the projects were charged with fraud. Chuck Burton/AP
But the plans that have been announced so far pale in comparison to the Trump administration’s nuclear ambitions. Earlier this year, Trump set a goal of adding a whopping 300 gigawatts of nuclear capacity by 2050, up from a little under 100 GW today. That would mean much stronger growth than is currently projected in Wood Mackenzie’s forecasts, which show a near-doubling of U.S. nuclear generation capacity to about 190 GW in 2050.
The main driver behind the Trump administration’s interest in nuclear is its ambitions for artificial intelligence. Chris Wright, the U.S. energy secretary, has described the race to develop advanced AI as the Manhattan Project of our times, critical to national security, and dependent upon a steep increase in electricity generation. Speaking to the Council on Foreign Relations in September, Wright promised: “We’re doing everything we can to make it easy to build power generation and data centers in our country.”
One of the hallmarks of the Trump administration has been its readiness to intervene in markets to pursue its policy goals. Its nuclear strategy exemplifies that approach. In many ways, the Trump administration is acting like an energy company: using its financial strength and its convening power to put together a deal that covers the entire nuclear value chain.
Throughout the history of nuclear power, the industry has worked closely with governments. But the federal government effectively taking a commercial position in the development of new reactors would be a first for the United States. In the first wave of U.S. reactor construction in the 1970s, federal government support was limited to R&D, uranium mining and enrichment, and indemnifying operators against the risk of nuclear accidents.
Before the partial deregulation of U.S. electricity markets that began in the 1990s, utilities could develop nuclear plants with the assurance that the costs could be recovered from customers, even if they went far over budget. With many key markets now at least partially deregulated, nuclear project developers will need other types of guarantees to secure financing and move forward.
The first new plants that result from the $80 billion deal will come online years after Trump has left office. But they could play an important role in boosting U.S. electricity supply and developing advanced AI for decades.
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