
A use-after-free in Ghostscript’s Type 1 font loader lets a crafted document cross Ghostscript’s -dSAFER sandbox, alter native path controls, and execute attacker-chosen commands as the rendering process.
Ghostscript sits beneath print, email, upload, and preview workflows. Our ImageMagick research showed how files named .png or .jpg can still reach Ghostscript through image conversion. The index below records confirmed affected paths alongside additional applications whose renderer routes we traced.
Upload2Shell / public record
From the first escape to the downstream reports, fixes, and publication.
27 JUL 2026DISCOVERY
We found a Type 1 font-loader path out of Ghostscript's -dSAFER boundary. A crafted document gained native access inside the rendering process.
BY 30 JULGOOGLE PROOF
A signed-out request for an attacker-hosted file reached Ghostscript in Google's document renderer. We sent the production proof to Google.
12 AUG 2026WORDPRESS FIX
Core's upload path exposed the renderer to Author+ users and any Contributor granted upload_files. Public upload fields in multiple plugins required no WordPress login. WordPress shipped its separate CVE-2026-65640 fix.
BY 02 SEPUPSTREAM REPORT
We filed the Type 1 loader flaw upstream as Artifex Bug 709684. Our broader audit also produced other independent Ghostscript findings.
08 SEP 2026UPSTREAM RELEASE
BY 09 SEPOTHER GHOSTSCRIPT ROOT
We confirmed a production document-processing finding in our broader Ghostscript research. Its individual root and proof belong to a separate case study.
12 SEP 2026DISTRIBUTION UPDATE
Ghostscript 10.08.0 entered Debian unstable. The Debian 13 security update followed later.
17 SEP · 23:53 ETDEBIAN REPORT
Confirmed unauthenticated remote command execution: an IPP job to a shared queue ran on the host as lp. We sent the network reproduction to Debian Security.
18 SEP · 00:25 ETROUNDCUBE REPORT
Confirmed remote execution after an external sender's attachment was thumbnailed when its email was viewed. The tested ImageMagick delegate ran the proof as www-data.
18 SEP · 00:26 ETPLESK REPORT
Confirmed command execution in the Roundcube thumbnail path shipped with Plesk Obsidian. We reported the result to WebPros.
18 SEP · 00:26 ETELEMENTOR REPORT
Confirmed unauthenticated remote command execution through a public registration widget with an upload field enabled. We reported the route to the plugin team.
18 SEP · 00:28 ETFORMINATOR REPORT
Confirmed unauthenticated remote command execution through a public PDF form configured to store files in the WordPress Media Library. We sent the report to the plugin team.
18 SEP · 00:28 ETMAYAN REPORT
Confirmed remote command execution when a configured document inbox imported and rendered an external email attachment. We sent the worker-chain report.
18 SEP · 00:29 ETDOKUWIKI REPORT
Confirmed command execution through an open wiki's upload and resize path using its optional ImageMagick backend. We sent the report.
18 SEP · 00:30 ETWIKIMEDIA REPORT
Confirmed command execution through PdfHandler on a wiki configured for anonymous PDF uploads. We sent the MediaWiki reproduction to Wikimedia Security.
BY 18 SEPAPPLICATION TEST
Confirmed command execution in the preview worker through an authenticated upload or an upload-share capability.
BY 25 SEPOTHER GHOSTSCRIPT ROOT
Confirmed a production route in our broader Ghostscript research. The individual access path, root, and proof will appear with its case study.
BY 25 SEPOTHER GHOSTSCRIPT ROOT
Confirmed a production route in our broader Ghostscript research. The individual access path, root, and proof will appear with its case study.
25 SEP 2026DEBIAN SECURITY
Debian published its first stable-security Ghostscript update after our report. The current fixed security build followed in October.
25 SEP 2026PUBLIC TEASER
We have found one zeroday that preauth RCE'd Debian 13, Google, Roundcube, Plesk, Wikimedia, Box, Dropbox, Zoom, Forminator, Elementor, WordPress Core, among many more. Details soon!
pwn.ai · 25 September 2026
10 OCT 2026DEBIAN SECURITY
Debian published 10.05.1~dfsg-1+deb13u3, the Debian 13 security build now marked fixed for Upload2Shell.
19 OCT 2026ROUNDCUBE FIX
Roundcube restricted unsafe attachment image types before ImageMagick conversion under CVE-2026-114727.
21 OCT 2026UBUNTU SECURITY
USN-8949-1 included our Ghostscript font-loader finding and fixed package versions for seven Ubuntu releases, including Ubuntu Pro and Legacy branches.
06 NOV 2026CVE REQUEST
We submitted assignment requests for the Type 1 loader flaw after the upstream fix and downstream reports.
09 NOV 2026CVE PUBLICATION
The Ghostscript root received its public identifier. Individual case studies and PoCs will be linked from the product table as they appear.
10 NOV 2026GOOGLE FIX
Google fixed the affected image and document processing path before our public case study.
NOWROLLING PUBLICATION
Upstream Ghostscript and tracked WordPress, Debian, and Ubuntu fixes are available. We will link the product-specific posts, proofs, and remaining vendor responses as each is published.
?UNPUBLISHED
Another print filter, thumbnailer, or document preview may be the next route into the interpreter. New results will be added with their own trigger, evidence, and fix.
The times on 17–18 September mark when the vendor reports were sent. Technical evidence and access conditions are in the index and writeup. Dropbox and the redacted services belong to separate Ghostscript findings.
Evidence index Updated 18 November 2026
A single interpreter surfaced behind very different file-processing features. Each entry shows who can supply the file, where it goes, and what we observed or traced.
01 / 02
Complete network chain01
Ghostscript 10.05.1~dfsg-1+deb13u1
Access
Anonymous IPP Print-Job to a shared network queue
Observed
Command on the host as uid=7(lp)
Proof
One remote run; separate 20/20 local conversions
Application chain02
Ghostscript 10.05.1
Access
External sender; recipient views message. Tested ImageMagick delegate required.
Observed
Command as uid=33(www-data); no attachment click
Proof
5/5 message-view trials
Application chain03
WordPress 7.0.2 · Ghostscript 10.05.1
Access
Signed-out public PDF form; Media Library storage enabled
Observed
Command as uid=33(www-data)
Proof
5/5 HTTP trials
Application chain04
Elementor 4.2.0 · WordPress 7.0.2 · Ghostscript 10.05.1
Access
Signed-out public Login/Register widget with configured upload field
Observed
Command as uid=33(www-data)
Proof
5/5 HTTP trials
Application chain05
Ghostscript 10.05.1
Access
Anonymous PDF upload and thumbnail on a site configured for anonymous uploads
Observed
Command as uid=33(www-data)
Proof
5/5 HTTP trials
Application chain06
Ghostscript 10.05.1
Access
Open wiki; anonymous upload and resize; optional ImageMagick backend
Observed
Command as uid=33(www-data)
Proof
5/5 HTTP trials
Application chain07
Official image · Ghostscript 10.05.1
Access
External email to a configured POP3 document source
Observed
Command as uid=1000 inside the application container
Proof
One email-to-worker run; parser 5/5
Application chain08
Ghostscript 10.05.1
Access
Authenticated upload or valid upload-share capability
Observed
Command in the preview worker
Proof
5/5 complete API trials
Official WordPress advisory09
Affected: 7.0.0–7.0.3, 6.9.0–6.9.6, and earlier branches in the advisory · Local renderer: 6.9.4 with Ghostscript 10.05.1
Product CVE-2026-65640 · Upload2Shell root CVE-2026-125396
Access
upload_files capability: Author+ by default, or a Contributor granted it; Imagick and Ghostscript required
Impact
Remote code execution confirmed by WordPress; exact delegate ran as uid=33
Evidence
Official advisory and release; 10/10 exact renderer trials
WordPress release ↗GHSA advisory ↗
Plesk-shipped stack10
Roundcube 1.6.17 · Ghostscript 9.54.0
Entry
Roundcube thumbnail path in the Plesk distribution
Observed
Command as uid=995(roundcube_sysuser) in 5/5 direct component trials
Boundary
AppArmor blocked shell in an enforced test; deployed endpoint not tested
Renderer reached11
Pillow 13.0.0 · Ubuntu 24.04 · Ghostscript installed
Access
Image submission to an unauthenticated gr.Image app
Path
HTTP preprocessing loaded EPS bytes named .png through Pillow
Evidence
gs -dSAFER started before the app function ran
Source-mapped path12
Source revision 5921fd6e
Access
Single-user image upload; no login on a reachable service
Path
Upload calls Pillow Image.open() and load()
Evidence
Upload and authentication paths in pinned source
Source-mapped path13
Source revision 82a973c0 · Gradio 3.41.2 · Pillow 9.5.0
Access
Shared img2img upload; login only if configured
Path
Gradio image preprocessing converts pixels through Pillow
Evidence
Image input and preprocessing in pinned source
Source-mapped path14
Source revision 0263e488
Access
Image upload and preview on a reachable service
Path
Preview opens and converts the uploaded file with Pillow
Evidence
Upload and preview routes in pinned source
Source-mapped path15
Frappe source revision 2bf593fd
Access
Image upload with an account, or as a guest when enabled
Path
Image optimization calls Pillow thumbnail processing
Evidence
Upload handler and optimization code in pinned source
Source-mapped path16
Source revision e87199c7 · image upload integration
Access
Account image upload; public thumbnail endpoint
Path
Thumbnail loads and resizes the image through Pillow
Evidence
Upload and thumbnail routes in pinned source
Source-mapped path17
Source revision b976874b
Access
Task-data upload with an account
Path
Frame worker calls Pillow Image.open().load()
Evidence
Task route and frame worker in pinned source
Source-mapped path18
Source revision bcfdfcaa · official image includes Ghostscript
Access
Email attachment through a configured inbox
Path
PDF/A conversion calls Ghostscript directly
Evidence
Mail importer and converter in pinned source
Source candidate19
Source revision 42ab4a73
Access
Authenticated django-filer image upload
Path
Image model opens the file with Pillow
Evidence
Pillow identification path in pinned source
The first ten entries record Upload2Shell execution. Gradio records a live HTTP-to-Ghostscript handoff; the remaining entries map application code to image-processing sinks.
02 / 02
Production · Upload2Shell root20
Image and document processing · Ghostscript 10.05.0
Access
Signed-out request for an attacker-hosted file
Observed
Native renderer control and a bounded worker file read
Fixed
Google mitigated the affected path on 10 November 2026
Patch status
Ghostscript 10.08.0 fixes Upload2Shell. Debian backported the upstream change into its security package. Ubuntu released fixed Ghostscript packages for seven supported releases on 21 October 2026; its notice described our font-loader finding before the CVE number was assigned. Application teams also closed routes into the renderer: WordPress fixed the Author+ upload path under CVE-2026-65640, and Roundcube restricted unsafe attachment image types before ImageMagick conversion under CVE-2026-114727. The technical writeup lists distribution package versions.
We found several other Ghostscript issues with lower or comparable impact and reported them upstream. Ghostscript sits beneath more file-processing features than most applications expose directly. We expect the security community to find additional software that reaches this vulnerability through uploads, thumbnails, print jobs, and document imports.